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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : Case No. 890666-CA 
v. : 
BRUCE WILLIAM MATHEWS, : Priority 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an interlocutory appeal from a district court 
order denying a motion to quash the circuit court bindover order. 
This Court granted a petition for permission to appeal. This 
Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal under Utah Code Ann. 
S§ 77-35-26(2)(c) and 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
1. Does a district court have appellate jurisdiction 
to review the sufficiency of the evidence presented in the 
circuit court supporting the order binding the defendant over for 
trial? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The text of all relevant statutes, rules and 
constitutional provisions is included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant in counts one and two with 
theft by deception, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (Supp. 1989), or alternatively, with 
communications fraud, a third degree felony in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1) (Supp. 1989); in count three with 
communications fraud; and in count four with communications 
fraud, or alternatively, theft by deception (R. 7-8). After a 
preliminary hearing on January 18, 1989 before Judge Dennis M. 
Fuchs, count four was amended on the State's motion to theft by 
deception. Judge Fuchs dismissed the alternative charge of 
communications fraud on count two and bound defendant over for 
trial (R. 3). 
Defendant was arraigned on February 3, 1989 before 
Judge Richard H. Moffat in the Third District Court (R. 20). 
Trial was scheduled for March 22, 1989 (R. 20). The trial was 
continued to April 10, 1989 (R. 24). Defendant moved to strike 
the jury panel. Judge Moffat granted the motion, and continued 
the case to April 14, 1989 for a rehearing (R. 49). Defendant 
waived his speedy trial rights and a new trial date of May 24, 
1989 was scheduled (R. 50). 
Defendant later discharged his counsel, Brooke Wells, 
and new counsel, Manny Garcia, was appointed for him (R. 51, 55). 
The trial was again rescheduled for August 14, 1989 (R. 53). Mr. 
Garcia left the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association and Nancy 
Bergeson entered her appearance as counsel in his place (R. 59). 
The trial was again rescheduled for October 30, 1989 (R. 64). 
On October 6, 1989, Ms. Bergeson moved to quash the 
bindover order "on the basis that there was no evidence presented 
to sustain the bindover order of the Circuit Court." (R. 65). 
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Judge Moffat denied the motion on October 13, 1989 and signed the 
order denying the motion on October 27, 1989 (R. 72, 74, 99). 
Defendant petitioned for an interlocutory appeal on November 15, 
1989 (R. 76-93). This Court granted permission for an 
interlocutory appeal on December 19, 1989 (R. 95). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
There are no additional facts other than those set 
forth in the Statement of the Case, above. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district courts do not have jurisdiction to review 
the evidence supporting the bindover orders of circuit courts. 
The statute previously providing the district courts with 
appellate and supervisory authority over the circuit courts was 
amended in 1986 and the authority was eliminated. Defendant 
should have filed an interlocutory appeal petition in this Court 
directly from the circuit court order rather than filing a motion 
to quash in the district court if he wished appellate review of 
the bindover order. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURTS LACK JURISDICTION TO 
REVIEW THE ORDERS OF CIRCUIT COURTS. 
Defendant characterized his action in the district 
court as a motion to quash the bindover order. He argues that he 
was not seeking appellate review in the district court. 
Alternatively, he argues that even if he was seeking appellate 
review, the District Court has appellate jurisdiction over 
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bindover orders issued by magistrates. Regardless of defendant's 
characterization, what defendant sought was review on the record 
from the circuit court of the sufficiency of the evidence 
presented to that court. He requested the district court to 
reverse the order of the circuit court based upon that review. 
This type of on-the-record review of the sufficiency of the 
evidence with the requested relief being reversal of the order 
reviewed can be nothing other than appellate review. 
The standard rule is that appellate 
jurisdiction in the authority to review the 
actions or judgments of an inferior tribunal 
upon the record made in that tribunal, and to 
affirm, modify or reverse such action or 
judgment. 
Peatross v. Board of Comm'rs of Salt Lake County, 555 P.2d 281, 
284 (Utah 1976). The district court ruled that defendant sought 
appellate review of the circuit court order. It concluded that 
it lacked authority to review bindover orders of the circuit 
court and denied the motion to quash. This ruling was correct. 
Article VIII, section 5 of the Utah Constitution 
states: "The district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as 
provided by statute." This provision was adopted in 1985 and 
markedly contrasts with its 1896 predecessor, which provided that 
a district court has "appellate jurisdiction from all inferior 
courts and tribunals, and supervisory control of the same." 
Prior to 1986, Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1) provided: 
The district court shall have original 
jurisdiction in all matters civil and 
criminal, not excepted in the Constitution 
and not prohibited by law; appellate 
jurisdiction from all inferior courts and 
tribunals, and a supervisory control of the 
same. 
See 1986 Utah Laws ch. 47, § 50. In 1986, the jurisdiction of 
the district court was redefined in Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4 
(Supp. 1989). Subsection (1) states: "The district court has 
original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal . . .." 
The only reference to appellate jurisdiction is in subsection 
(5): "The district court has jurisdiction to review agency 
adjudicative proceedings as set forth in Chapter 46b, Title 63 . 
. .." Thus, the district court has no authority to review the 
orders of a circuit court under the only statute granting it 
appellate authority. 
Defendant argues that the circuit court judge in this 
case was sitting as a magistrate and not as a circuit court 
judge. He asserts that the District Court has appellate 
jurisdiction to review orders of magistrates. This argument 
lacks merit because, as illustrated above, the district court 
does not have appellate jurisdiction over magistrates' orders 
either. 
Defendant argues that Rules 10 and 12 of the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure establish the district court's statutory 
authority for exercising appellate jurisdiction over bindover 
orders. Neither of these rules contain any provision that can be 
construed to vest appellate jurisdiction over bindover orders in 
the district courts. Rule 12 provides: 
(b) Any defense, objection or request, 
including request for rulings on the 
admissibility of evidence, which is capable 
of determination without the trial of the 
general issue may be raised prior to trial by 
written motion. The following shall be 
raised at least five days prior to the trial: 
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(1) Defenses and objections based on defects 
in the indictment or information other than 
that it fails to show jurisdiction in the 
court or to charge an offense, which 
objection shall be noticed by the court at 
any time during the pendency of the 
proceeding; . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-12(b)(1) (1982, repealed effective July 1, 
1990). Rule 12 states that defects in the information must be 
raised at least five days prior to trial. Defendant alleged no 
defect in the information in support of his motion to quash. He 
alleged that the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing 
was insufficient to support the bindover order. Rule 12 says 
nothing about motions concerning bindover orders. 
Rule 10(c) provides: 
Any defect or irregularity in or want or 
absence of any proceeding provided for by 
statute or these rules prior to arraignment 
shall be specifically and expressly objected 
to before a plea of guilty is entered or the 
same is waived. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-10(c) (Supp. 1989, repealed effective July 
1, 1990). Defendant's reliance on this provision for the 
district court's jurisdiction to review bindover orders is 
misplaced because this provision does not mandate where the 
objection must be made, only that it must be made timely or it is 
waived. The language of this rule is consistent with the State's 
position that a defendant must take a timely, interlocutory 
appeal from the bindover order. 
This Court is vested with jurisdiction to review the 
orders of circuit courts in Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) (Supp. 
1989). Accordingly, if defendant wished review of the 
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sufficiency of the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing, 
he should have filed a timely interlocutory appeal frt>m the 
circuit court order. State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 270 (Utah 
1985). As the Supreme Court held in Schreuder/ Utah Code Ann. § 
77-35-26(2)(c) (Supp. 1989) governs appeals from bindover orders 
of circuit courts and grants a defendant the right to petition 
for an interlocutory appeal from the order. 
Defendant asserts that the district court has original 
jurisdiction to hear the motion to quash a circuit court bindover 
order. Thus, he contends that the district court could review 
the sufficiency of the evidence presented at the preliminary 
hearing. This assertion relies upon defendant's 
mischaracterization of the review he sought as something other 
than appellate review. As stated more fully above, what 
defendant sought from the district court was review of the 
circuit court record and a determination by the district court 
that the record was insufficient to support the order. This is 
nothing other than appellate review. Peatross, 555 P.2d at 284. 
Section 78-3-4 and art. VIII, § 5 both speak of original 
jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction as separate classes of 
jurisdiction. Since appellate jurisdiction is the authority of a 
court to review orders of other tribunals, original jurisdiction 
must refer to the authority of a court to hear matters originally 
filed in that court. By simply characterizing his motion as an 
original action in the district court, defendant cannot transform 
appellate review into something that is included in the district 
court's original jurisdictional authority. If this were 
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possible, anyone could characterize anything in a way in which 
they could obtain a hearing in the court of their choice rather 
than in the court that is designated to hear the matter. Cf. 
DeBry v. Salt Lake County Board of Appeals, 764 P.2d 627 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988)(constitutional grant of general appellate 
jurisdiction does not grant specific appellate jurisdiction where 
there is no statutory appellate authority over the tribunal 
appealed from)• 
In Point II of his brief, defendant argues that this 
Court should place review of bindover orders in the hands of the 
district court in the interest of judicial economy. Not only are 
defendant's arguments weak, but they encourage this Court to make 
a policy decision that may only be made by the Legislature. 
Defendant asserts that the district court could more 
quickly dispose of the issue of whether a bindover was supported 
by sufficient evidence than could this Court. He asserts that 
Rule 12 governs such a review and that he is required to raise 
the issue at least five days prior to trial. He argues, 
therefore, that the district court would necessarily decide the 
issue during the five days prior to trial and that this process 
would be much faster than interlocutory review. 
There are several flaws in defendant's scheme of 
review. First, defendant's assertion that the district court 
would review the case much more quickly is not necessarily 
accurate. Defendant's review scheme is attached to the trial 
date — a date that, for many reasons, may be continued 
repeatedly as is amply demonstrated by this case. A criminal 
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it would be required to fit the review of a bindover order into 
its already overcrowded trial schedule. The court might be 
required to read several volumes of transcript from the 
preliminary hearing to properly evaluate a defendant's claim of 
insufficient evidence. 
This Court's primary function is appellate review of 
the records created in lower courts. This Court is well-equipped 
to perform that function. Defendant asserts that the district 
courts are better equipped to review bindovers to avoid costly 
trials that may later be overturned due to a defective bindover. 
This assertion ignores that if a defendant raised a valid issue 
for an interlocutory appeal from the bindover order, the issue 
would be disposed of before the district court was required to do 
anything with the case. 
Defendant relies on State v. Archuleta, 501 P.2d 263, 
264 (Utah 1972), for the contention that the trial court is in a 
more advantaged position to review fact intensive issues. This 
case is distinguishable from Archuleta where the Supreme Court 
was faced with review of rulings initially entered by the 
district court. The district court would be in a more advantaged 
position to review claims of unfairness about the very proceeding 
it presided over. In this case, defendant requested the district 
court to review the proceedings of a different tribunal. The 
nature of the review is incomparable. Defendant's assertion, 
based upon Archuleta, that the trial court is better able to 
review fact intensive issues misses the mark because this 
assertion would only be valid if the district court had made the 
initial determination to bind defendant over for trial. 
I II! Il ". 
considerations dictated LhaL I lie district court 
appropriate forum for appellate review of circuit court bindover 
district cour t: Article VIII * 5 authorizes the district ::ourts 
exercise appellate jurisdiction - provided statute I here 
orders circuit courts .-. : magistrates ;r this reason, 
the district court correctly denied defendan motion to quash 
the bindover order, and this Court should a;;,.;,, u.a district 
court's order. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court 
to affirm the district court's order denying defendant • _.on 
t: :: qi lash the zi i: :::i :i il t • :: :: i :i i: t: c r d€ r 1 . 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this t :- day of April, 1990. 
R. PAUL wrAN DAM 
Attorney General 
/X SANDRA I/^^JOGRkN 
<s A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y General 
4 S / 
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